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1. 2005 ME 50, 870 A.2d 566.
2. Id. ¶ 1, 870 A.2d at 568.
3. Under 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D (2004), proposed activities must not unreasonably
interfere with or harm nine criteria: existing scenic uses, soil, habitat, water flow, water
quality, flooding, sand or gravel, river segments and dredging.  For a comprehensive analysis
of wetland permitting in Maine, see William E. Taylor & David P. Littell, Wetland
Permitting in Maine, 12 ME. BAR J. 274, 274-287 (1997).  
4. Kroeger v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50, ¶ 1, 870 A.2d at 568.  See supra note
3.
5. Id. at ¶ 14, 870 A.2d at 570.
6. To be eligible for a permit, applicants intending to alter a wetland or water body must
demonstrate that there are no “practicable alternative[s] to the project that would be less
damaging to the environment.”  Me. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 06 096 CMR 310-4. 
“Practicable” is defined as “[a]vailable and feasible considering cost, existing
technology and logistics based on the overall purpose of the project alternatives.” Me. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot. 06 096 CMR 310-3.
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REGULATING AESTHETICS OF COASTAL MAINE:
KROEGER v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Nancy Walworth*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kroeger v. Department of Environmental Protection,1 the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held that the Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP) had appropriately denied a private
landowner a permit to build a dock.2  Out of nine permitting criteria3
enforced by the DEP, the court held that the structure would violate one
criterion: the unreasonable interference with the scenic uses of Somes
Sound.4  The majority cited the enjoyment of the Sound by boaters and
recreationalists, as well as the nearby tourist attraction of Acadia National
Park as factors supporting the area’s scenic use.5  The majority found that
the DEP had not arbitrarily denied the permit and that the plaintiff had
practicable alternatives6 to building the proposed dock, including utilizing
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7. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50, ¶¶ 19-20, 870 A.2d at 570.
8. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26, 870 A.2d at 573 (Dana, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at ¶¶ 38-40, 870 A.2d at 575-76.
10. Id.
11. Aesthetics are defined as “a branch of philosophy dealing with the nature of beauty,
art, and taste and with the creation and appreciation of beauty.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 21 (3d ed. 1993).
12. See, e.g., Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power,
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 697, 700-01 (1995) (“The highest court in nearly every state
has wrestled with the concept of land-use regulation for aesthetic objectives.”).  See also,
Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603, 623 (1981) (the
author suggests that aesthetics is considered an “old pariah” when crafting judicial
decisions).
13. Kimberly K. Smith, Mere Taste: Democracy and the Politics of Beauty, 7 WIS.
ENVTL. L.J. 151, 154 (2000).
14. Id. at 155-56. 
15. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954).
16. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 1, 870 A.2d at 568.
17. See also, Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 88, 876 A.2d 16; Conservation
a local marina and making boat launches from the shore.7  The dissenting
opinion, however, argued the plaintiff’s application satisfied the DEP’s
wetland permitting criteria and that no perceptible visual impairment would
occur by constructing the plaintiff’s proposed dock.8  The dissent
maintained that the plaintiff had no practicable alternatives by which to
reasonably access and utilize the waterfront.9  In addition, the dissent
criticized the majority for overlooking the plaintiff’s property rights as a
landowner and instead deferring too readily to the DEP’s decision
regarding scenic uses.10
The Kroeger decision highlights the ongoing debate over the use of
aesthetics11 as a legitimate basis for regulations protecting visual
resources.12  The subject of aesthetics is by its nature controversial: at its
heart are questions and subjective assessments pertaining to beauty - its
value, importance, and whether it should or should not be afforded
protection in particular situations.13  Nonetheless, aesthetic regulations have
existed throughout this country’s history, gaining traction in the early 20th
century.14  The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
aesthetic regulations, first via zoning cases, and then by way of dicta
forceful enough to inspire the growth of aesthetic regulations by state
governments.15  Aesthetic regulations have been and continue to be utilized
in Maine, as demonstrated by Kroeger.16  Indeed, much of the case law
surrounding aesthetics in Maine involves the DEP’s scenic uses provision,
and often focuses on coastal locales.17  However, Kroeger offers a new
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Law Found. Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME ¶ 62, 823 A.2d 551; Hannum v. Bd. of
Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME ¶ 123, 832 A.2d 765.
18. Police powers are defined as “[t]he inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to
make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality,
and justice.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).  See also Ernst Freund, THE
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 3 (1904) (“[I]t is possible
to evolve at least two main attributes or characteristics which differentiate the police power:
it aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare, and it does so by restraint or
compulsion.”);  Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (an early exploration
of the concept of police powers by the Massachusetts municipal court).
19. See Bobrowski, supra note 12 at 701-02.
20. Id. at 702.
21. Id.
dimension because it involves the issue of tourism along Maine’s coast.
The question now arises: given the important role tourism plays in this
state’s economy, how should the Law Court weigh the competing interests
of preserving both aesthetic value and land owners’ rights when the
protected area is near a coastal tourist destination? 
This Note considers where Maine generally stands in the national
debate regarding aesthetic regulation after Kroeger, and where it may be
headed in terms of coastal aesthetic regulation.  First, this Note chronicles
how aesthetic regulations slowly developed from the general laws of
nuisance into the legitimate exercise of the police powers.18  It then
describes the two different approaches taken by various jurisdictions in this
country for validating aesthetic regulations.19  The first approach is
premised on the belief that aesthetic regulations on their face fit securely
within the general welfare prong of the police powers.20  The other
approach relegates aesthetics to a secondary role, not allowing them to
stand alone, but rather to play an ancillary role in the government interests
of health, safety, moral, or general welfare.21  This Note then chronicles
how Maine specifically has interpreted aesthetic regulations, analyzing the
approaches in Kroeger that the Law Court’s majority and dissent utilized,
and criticizing both sides for not more fully explaining their rationales.  In
conclusion, this Note contends that in its next relevant case the Law Court
should more fully detail the preferred basis for aesthetic regulations in
Maine, potentially creating a litmus test for cases involving popular coastal
scenic areas.  In addition, this Note suggests that the Maine Legislature
could include the promotion of the economy, which would encompass
tourism, as a legitimate category within the state’s police powers.  Such a
specific governmental directive would decidedly aid the Law Court in
future coastal aesthetic regulations cases.
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22. See Smith, supra note 13, at 154.
23. Id. at 155.
24. Id.
25. See generally Erik Larson, DEVIL IN THE WHITE CITY, 374 (2003).  The City
Beautiful movement began with the Chicago World’s Fair, which, in its creation of a model
utopian city, sought to elevate American cities to the level of the great European cities and
in turn spurred a new direction in “modern urban planning.”  Id.
26. Jan G. Laitos, National Parks and the Recreation Resource, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
847, 848 (1997).
27. Id. at 848-49.
28. See Smith, supra note 13, at 157.
29. See generally City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co., 62 A. 267 (N.J. 1905);
Crawford v. Topeka, 33 P. 476 (Kan. 1893); Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74
N.E. 601 (Mass. 1905).
30. 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905).
31. See Smith, supra note 13, at 158.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF AESTHETIC REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Defining Aesthetics and Its Place in the Law
The rise of the American environmental movement depended not only
on scientific and biological breakthroughs, but also on the social sciences.22
Artists, authors, and even politicians have waxed eloquent about the merits
of natural beauty throughout this country’s history.23 The popularity of
environmental appreciation and protection grew with the words of Emerson
and Thoreau, the vistas painted by the Hudson River Valley School, the
development of New York’s Central Park by Frederick Law Olmstead, the
championing of national parks by President Theodore Roosevelt,24 and the
popularity of the City Beautiful movement.25  Popularity increased further
as the concept of leisure began to overlap with outdoor recreation.26  The
increase in disposable income and transportation resources provided
vacationing Americans the means to enjoy the “aesthetic and environmental
qualities of nature.”27  Despite the groundswell of support by the public in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, legal recognition of aesthetic
interests came at a slower pace.28  City ordinances that attempted to curb
the construction of unsightly signage were regularly thrown out of court.29
In the case of City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co., the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey wrote, “[W]e [are not] aware of any case
which holds that a man may be deprived of his property because his tastes
are not those of his neighbors.  A[e]sthetic considerations are a matter of
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity . . . .”30
The dichotomy between social acceptance and legal hesitance, as one
commentator wrote, “beg[s] the question of what ‘aesthetic’ means.”31
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32. Id. at 158-59.
33. In fact, “[e]ntire books and entire undergraduate- and graduate-level philosophy
courses are devoted to the study of ‘aesthetics.’  Some philosophers have dedicated their
whole careers to discussing and writing about ‘aesthetics.’”  Avi Brisman, The Aesthetics of
Wind Energy Systems, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 81 (2005).
34. The full quote of philosopher Moritz Geiger reads: 
[A]esthetics is, like a weather vane, turned around by any philosophical, cultural, or
scientific gust of wind; one moment it is pursued meta-physically and the next
moment empirically, now normatively and now descriptively, one moment from the
point of view of the artist, the next moment from the art-lover's point of view, today
the centre of aesthetics is seen in art, for which natural beauty is regarded only as a
preliminary stage, but tomorrow the beauty of art is seen only as some second-hand
surrogate of the beauty of nature.
Otto Neumaier, What is the Subject of Aesthetics?, http://sowi.iwp.uni-
linz.ac.at/dialog/MITARBEITER/Sub_Aesth.html (last visited Apr., 4, 2006). 
35. See Smith, supra note 13, at 159.
36. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549, 1653 (2003).
37. See generally, Eugene C. Bricklemyer, Jr., et al., Preservation of Coastal Spaces: A
Dialogue on Oregon’s Experience with Integrated Land Use Management, 9 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 239, 240-41 (2004).
38. See Claeys, supra note 36, at 1653.
39. See generally, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1465 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (the Congressional
findings in the Coastal Zone Management Act read, “[t]he coastal zone is rich in a variety
of natural, commercial, recreational, ecological, industrial, and esthetic resources of
immediate and potential value to the present and future well-being of the Nation.”).  The
Coastal Zone Management Act “has resulted in the creation of management programs in
thirty-four of the eligible thirty-five coastal states, which are where management action
agendas are developed and implemented.”  See Bricklemyer, supra note 37, at 240.
There is little scholarly agreement on an explicit definition, but at its heart
is the philosophical study of beauty and taste.32  Given the lack of
consensus, contemplation of this “definition” naturally raises a host of
questions, such as “what is beauty?” and “who is the arbiter of beauty?”33
These two questions are especially problematic and highlight how aesthetic
value judgments can change “like a weather vane, turned around by any
philosophical, cultural, or scientific gust of wind.”34  Despite this unsettled
framework, American public opinion, public policy, and law forges ahead,
treating aesthetics as a worthy interest.35  This is particularly true of
aesthetics and coastal areas.36  When one considers coastal aesthetics, one
might feel contemplative, or imagine traditional scenes such as soaring
gulls, rocky shores, and idyllic seaside villages.37  Hidden from such
tranquil imagery is the fact that well-maintained coastal areas also “act as
storm barriers[,] . . . attract tourism[,]” and protect fragile ecosystems.38
Environmental policies protecting coastal areas are often underscored by
aesthetic principles.39  Thus, “whatever goals Americans are pursuing in
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40. Bricklemyer, supra note 37, at 240.
41. Andrew J. Cappel,  A Walk Along Willow, Patterns of Land Use Coordination in Pre-
Zoning New Haven (1870-1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 617 (1991).
42. George P. Smith, Re-Validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L.
REV. 687, 687 (2005) (“A nuisance is defined generally as merely some interference with
the use and enjoyment of the land,” quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D cmt. d
(1979)).
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b (1979).
44. See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1275-76 (1996).  (The colonies imposed
restrictions on beauty in some communities, such as New Amsterdam and New York City.
The New York Assembly, for instance, allowed New York City “to make ‘rules and orders
for the better . . . gracefulnesse of such new buildings as shall be Erected for habitations.’”
Id. at 1276 (citation omitted)).
45. John B. Grandoff, Preparing Zoning Opinions, PROB. & PROP., Oct. 1999, at 29.
46. See Cappel, supra note 41, at 617-19.
47. Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 74 N.E. 601, 602 (Mass. 1905).  The
court focused more on the Takings Clause than aesthetics, stating:
The question here is not of the power of the state to expend money or to lay taxes to
promote aesthetic ends, or to regulate the use of property with a view to promote such
ends. It is of the right of the state by such regulations to deprive the owner of property
of a natural use of that property without giving compensation for the resulting loss to
the owner.
Id. at 602.
their environmental policies, aesthetic interests are consistently among
them.”40
B.  Aesthetics and the United States Supreme Court
The history of aesthetic regulations began with zoning, which is the
regulated use of land within communities by local governments.41  Zoning
regulations themselves are rooted in the common law of nuisance,42 which
was premised upon the idea that general community interests should be
protected from interference; any such interference would constitute a
criminal offense.43  Restrictions on land use were common even in colonial
America,44 and after World War I, the urbanization of America saw
nuisance laws develop into municipality-adopted zoning regulations.45
While zoning ordinances often consider practicalities like building size
(such as mass or height) and purpose (such as residential or business),
zoning also inherently encompasses value judgments about community
aesthetic standards.46  When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reviewed early zoning cases, aesthetics were acknowledged but never
accepted as a singular, sound criteria for land use regulation.47  In Welch v.
Swasey, the United States Supreme Court upheld the city of Boston’s
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48. 214 U.S. 91, 108 (1909).
49. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  Interestingly, in the
District Court case of Ambler, the presiding Judge had strong concerns about the aesthetic
themes of the town’s zoning scheme.  Judge Westenhaver wrote that restrictions involving
community beautification standards could “not be done without compensation under the
guise of exercising the police power.” Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307,
316 (1924).
50. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 388.
51. Id. at 395.
52. Kenneth Regan, Note, You Can’t Build That Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic
Zoning and Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1017 (1990).  See also
Wilbur v. City of Newton, 18 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1938); Blitch v. City of Ocala, 195 So. 406
(Fla. 1940); Oliva v. City of Garfield, 62 A.2d 673 (N.J. 1948); Corthouts v. Town of
Newington, 99 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1953); Hoffmann v. City of Waukegan, 201 N.E.2d 177 (Ill.
App. 1964); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 188 N.E.2d 33, (Ill. 1963);
Thompson v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974); Town of Bay Harbor Islands
v. Driggs, 522 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike,
653 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio 1995); Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City Council, 690
N.E.2d 510 (Ohio 1998); King v. City of Bainbridge, 577 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 2003).
53. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
restrictions on building height as a proper exercise by legislature to protect
public safety, however, the Court also recognized that even if “considera-
tions of an aesthetic nature . . . entered into the reasons for [the
regulation’s] passage” such considerations “would not invalidate them.”48
As long as aesthetics were tied to more predominant zoning criteria, they
were acceptable background factors.
In a 1926 landmark zoning case, the concept of aesthetics was present,
although not directly mentioned.49  In Euclid, zoning provisions controlling
industrial and residential building specifications impacting the visual
environment were upheld as a legitimate exercise of the legislature’s police
powers.50  Justice Sutherland outlined the powers when he wrote “before
the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, [it must be demonstrated]
that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”51  The delineation and acceptance of the police powers by the
Court had an immediate impact: state jurisdictions quickly adopted the
police powers as a standard tool when analyzing the applicability and
justification for zoning regulations.52
Aesthetics finally were explicitly addressed in the dicta of Berman v.
Parker.53  Justice Douglas argued that the concept of the public welfare
must include aesthetics and that legislatures ought to control and protect
beauty in their communities: “[t]he concept of public welfare is broad and
inclusive.  The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
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54. Id.  In Berman v. Parker, Justice Douglas also wrote, “[i]t is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”  Id.
55. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 13, at 158  (“[Justice] Douglas’ expansive dicta went
beyond sanctioning the legislative action; he practically demanded it.”).  But see Regan,
supra note 52, at 1026 (contending that a “proper reading” of Berman v. Parker fails to
sustain legislation based on aesthetics).
56. 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981).
57. Id. at 507-08.  Justice Rehnquist’s support for aesthetic regulations went even further
in his dissent: “aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of
billboards within a community.”  Id. at 570-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 510.
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000) (The stated policy of 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) is “to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony . . . .”). 
aesthetic as well as monetary.”54 Berman led commentators to debate the
lasting effects of the dicta: had it sanctioned aesthetics legislation under the
general welfare power or did it lack constitutional support?55 The question
inspired by Berman was addressed in the notable and more recent case of
Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, where a billboard ordinance regulat-
ing specific types of signs was overturned for violating the First Amend-
ment.56  Despite the free speech focus of the case, the majority also recog-
nized aesthetic regulations as a “substantial government goal,” effectively
affirming aesthetic regulations as a permissible government function.57  It
is important to note that the Court in Metromedia acknowledged the risk of
aesthetic regulations: with the acceptance of aesthetic notions as
permissible goals comes the danger that regulations can be based on
subjective rationales that defy “objective evaluation.”58  The Court pointed
out that this risk mandates aesthetics be scrutinized carefully “to determine
if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose” that
would not fall within the police powers.59  These “impermissible purposes”
have been the subject of much litigation, as demonstrated by state court
cases below.
C.  Approach by State Jurisdictions: The Ancillary and Primary Views
Berman heralded a growing awareness of the importance of aesthetics
regulation in American society.  Federal action soon followed: Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act,60 the Wild and Scenic
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61. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000) (selecting certain rivers that possessed “outstandingly
remarkable scenic . . . or other similar values . . . [to] be preserved in free-flowing condi-
tion . . . . ”).
62. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000) (establishing a trail system to “promote the
preservation of . . . and enjoyment and appreciation of the open-air, outdoor areas and
historic resources of the Nation . . . .”).  Id. at § 1241(a). 
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451(b), 1451(e), 1452(1) (2000) (declaring it national policy “to
preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or  enhance, the resources of the
Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding  generations . . . .”).  Id. at § 1452(1).
64. See Smith, supra note 13, at 156-57.
65. See Bobrowksi, supra note 12, at 698-99.  The author lists Massachusetts as first
passing its wetland regulation statute in 1967.  Id. at 699, n.9.
66. See J.R. Golf Services, Inc. v. Linn County, 661 P.2d 91 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(prohibiting the construction of a golf course on farmland); Commonwealth v. Nat’l
Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (allowing a 307-foot
observation tower to be built despite the state’s aesthetic objections).
67. See Bobrowski, supra note 12, at 701-02.
68. See id. at 703.
69. See id. at 701.
70. Id. at 701-02 n.32.  Thirty states permit “aesthetics alone” regulation while five do
not.  Fifteen remain undecided or have not yet addressed the issue.  Id.  See also Robert D.
Dodson, Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisance in the New
Millennium, 10 S.C.ENVTL.L.J. 1, 9-10 (2002) (indicating that by 1982, eighteen states held
that zoning regulations based on aesthetics alone were Constitutional, while only seven held
the opposite). 
Rivers Act,61 the National Trails System Act,62 and the Coastal Zone
Management Act,63 all to protect the environment against public and private
mistreatment.64  States soon became involved as well, and as of the 1960s,
legislatures were passing statutes protecting wetlands.65  State regulation
even went so far as to focus regulations on locations ranging from golf
courses to battlefields. 66   The new legislation had to pass judicial scrutiny
for impermissible purposes, however, and two judicial approaches towards
aesthetic regulation began to emerge under the police powers: the ancillary
approach and the primary approach.67 In some jurisdictions, aesthetic
regulations were deemed ancillary to health and safety components of the
police powers.68  Conversely, other jurisdictions devised an “aesthetics
alone” approach, making aesthetics the primary purpose for regulations
under the general welfare police power.69  During the mid-1990s, the trend
in jurisdictions was to utilize the primary over the ancillary approach in
aesthetic regulation cases.70
The ancillary approach focuses on the health and safety functions of the
police power first, with aesthetics second.  For instance, the Court of
Appeals of New York linked billboard regulation to issues relating to traffic
safety, such as clear visibility and distraction prevention, although it
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71. New York State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 176 N.E.2d 566, 569
(N.Y. 1961).  The court had some classic quotes regarding aesthetic interests, and while it
was not amenable to considering aesthetics as a primary, legitimate purpose for billboard
regulations, the court certainly thought it was ancillary: “Beauty may not be queen but she
is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect.  She may at least shelter herself
under the wing of safety, morality or decency.”  Id. at 644 (quoting Perlmutter v. Greene,
182 N.E. 5, 6 (N.Y. 1932).  See also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
510 (1981) (“It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever
located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘aesthetic harm.’”); Pate v. City
Council of Tuscaloosa, 622 So. 2d 405, 408 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (The court reviewed
testimony of experts who opined that traffic safety was at risk when billboards were placed
in busy intersections that could distract motorists.  The court refused to remark on whether
the “propriety or impropriety of aesthetics” was an acceptable basis for municipal zoning
regulations); City of Hot Springs v. Carter, 836 S.W.2d. 863, 864 (Ark. 1992).
72. Bobrowski, supra note 12, at 712-13 (collecting cases); See 1000 Friends of Oregon
v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 737 P.2d 607 (Or. 1987); McNulty v. Town of
Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440
(Utah 1981).
73. See Bobrowski, supra note 12, at 712.
74. 814 P.2d 539 (Or. 1991).
75. Id. at 540.
76. Id. at 542.
77. See Donnrey Comm’ns Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 660 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1983).
78. Id. at 903.  “Hand in hand with aesthetics is tourism, one of Fayetteville's important
industries and a substantial economic resource.”  Id.
acknowledged the blight billboards created on motorways was akin to “a
plague of locusts.”71  Where developments near or on natural resources are
challenged, some jurisdictions addressed the public health and safety issues
first, and included scenic uses last.72  Scenic areas often overlap with
natural resource areas, creating an “easy alliance” between aesthetics and
environmental protection.73  In Oswego Properties, Inc. v. City of Lake
Oswego,74 the City denied a housing development plan to build a forty-four
foot wall in the proximity of existing trees because it failed to satisfy the
city’s open space requirement.75  The court held that the city’s standard of
maintaining aesthetic appearances justified the protection of the nearby
trees.76  Other jurisdictions such as Arkansas have also accepted the
promotion of tourism as a basis for regulations protecting the visual
landscape, rather than aesthetics alone.77  In Donnrey Communications Co.
v. City of Fayetteville, ordinances regulating outdoor advertising advanced
the legitimate government interest in tourism and aesthetics.78  In its
opinion, the court took note that the city’s board of directors had deemed
billboards as not only ill equipped mechanisms to provide useful
information to tourists, but also objects detrimental to the scenic resources
2005-2006] Kroeger v. Department of Environmental Protection 109
79. Id.
80. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
81. Id. at 897-98.
82. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
83. 404 S.E.2d at 896.
84. See Bobrowski, supra note 12, at 718.
85. Oregon City v. Hartke, 400 P.2d 255, 262-63 (Or. 1965).  The court held that a city
may wholly exclude a particular use of a property if it has a rational basis for doing so, and
“aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an exercise of the police power.” 
86. 811 A.2d 161 (Vt. 2002).  
87. 628 A.2d 247 (N.H. 1993).
88. Id. at 250.  See also Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 489 A.2d 600, 604 (N.H. 1985)
(allowing towns’ zoning regulations to consider “aesthetic values, such as preserving rural
charm”).
89. 872 A.2d 769, 772 (N.H. 2005).
that attracted tourists to the city in the first place.79  Although the case of
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council80 admittedly focused on a takings
and compensation challenge to South Carolina’s total ban on coastal
development rather than a specific aesthetic regulation, both aesthetics and
tourism were among the numerous factors behind the state’s Beachfront
Management Act that prohibited new development below an established
erosion line.81  Despite reversal on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,82 the
Supreme Court of South Carolina deemed preservation of “this existing
public resource . . . a ‘laudable goal.’”83
The primary approach advances protection of visual resources as its
chief objective and suggests that the general welfare prong of the police
powers includes aesthetics.84  Regulations of eyesores such as junkyards
and wind turbines pass judicial scrutiny for solely aesthetic purposes.  In
Oregon, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance regulating a
wrecking yard for purely aesthetic purposes.85  In the case In re Halnon, the
Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the Vermont Public Service Board’s
denial of a certificate to build a wind turbine based on the adverse aesthetic
impact it would have on the environment.86  The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has been explicit in its acceptance of the primary approach.  In
Asselin v. Town of Conway,87 where a sign owner protested the
municipality’s directives regarding lighted signage, the court stated, “We
now conclude that municipalities may validly exercise zoning power solely
to advance aesthetic values, because the preservation or enhancement of the
visual environment may promote the general welfare.”88 Asselin was cited
by the Court in the more recent case of Taylor v. Town of Plaistow, where
a zoning ordinance required a distance of 1,000 feet between car
dealerships for purely aesthetic reasons.89
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90. See, e.g., Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm’n, 328 A.2d 791 (Me. 1974); Mack v.
Mun. Officers, 463 A.2d 717 (Me. 1983); Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 79, 797
A.2d 27; Widewaters Stillwater Co. v. Bangor Area Citizens Organized for Responsible
Dev., 2002 ME 27, 790 A.2d 597; Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994);
Murphy v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 615 A.2d 255 (Me. 1992); Town of Freeport v. Brickyard
Cove Associates, 594 A.2d 556 (Me. 1991); Lincoln Homes Corp. v. Town of Newcastle,
LINSC-AP-02-002 (Me. Super. Ct., Lin. Cty., Feb. 25, 2004) (Marden, J.).
91. 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978), rev’d sub nom. John Donnelly & Sons v.
Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 1278.
93. Id. at 1279.
94. 200 A.2d 543 (Me. 1964).
95. Id. at 548.
96. 594 A.2d 556 (Me. 1991).
97. Id. at 557-58.
D.  Maine’s Aesthetic Regulation History
Maine courts are familiar with aesthetic regulation disputes and have
utilized both the ancillary and primary rationales, sometimes concurrently.90
This dual approach is evidenced by John Donnelly & Sons v. Roger L.
Mallar,91 wherein the United States District Court for the District of Maine
(Southern Division) upheld a law eliminating billboards because the
“preservation and promotion of aesthetic standards serves as an adequate
basis for comprehensive anti-billboard legislation.”92  In addition, the court
also linked the preservation of scenic beauty to economic health through
tourism, contending that billboards had negative economic consequences
on a state so dependent upon tourist dollars.93
Looking at singular uses, the Law Court employed the ancillary method
in the mobile-home zoning case of Wright v. Michaud.94  Upholding the
restrictions against placing mobile-homes in the town as non-discriminatory
and non-arbitrary, the court wrote:
[w]e do not feel that aesthetic considerations alone will warrant
zoning restrictions against individual mobile homes.  However, . . .
a municipality in determining whether there should be a prohibi-
tion of individual mobile homes . . . may properly consider, among
other factors, the impact of the use of that type of structure upon
the development of the community.95
The court also reflected the ancillary method in the critical waterfront
resource case of Town of Freeport v. Brickyard Cove Associates.96  The
town’s zoning regulation protected waterfront resource areas from timber
harvesting in an effort to control soil erosion.97  The defendant’s clearing
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98. Id. at 559.
99. Id. at 558 (quoting FREEPORT, ME., ZONING ORDINANCE § 420(A) (May 1988)).
100. 534 A.2d 663 (Me. 1987).
101. Id. at 664. The court wrote that the set-back requirement from the river’s edge
“reasonably promotes the town's interest in preserving, for the public's aesthetic
welfare . . . .”  Id.
102. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-A (2004).
103. Id.
104. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ISSUE PROFILE: NATURAL
RESOURCES PROTECTION ACT (NRPA) (2002), http://www.maine.gov/dep/blwq/docstand/ip-
nrpa.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, OVERVIEW OF MAINE’S
WETLANDS: THEIR FUNCTION AND VALUES, http://www.maine.gov/dep/blwq/docstand/
ipwetfv2.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).  The DEP estimates that there are five million acres
of freshwater tidal areas in Maine, and 157,500 acres of saltwater tidal wetlands, including
“tidal flats, salt marsh, brackish marsh, aquatic beds, beach bars and reefs.”  Id.
of timber not only threatened the soil, but also created a 7,500 square foot
gap in the forest canopy.98  The town’s regulations, although primarily
concerned with protection of the water and soil, also indicated the desire
to protect natural, scenic views.99 The court employed the primary purpose
approach in the case of Brophy v. Town of Castine.100  The court held that
the town’s requirement that satellite dishes be set back from a river by
seventy-five feet was justified by its interest in preserving the public’s
aesthetic welfare.101
The Maine Legislature has also formalized the government interest in
protecting natural resource aesthetics.  The Natural Resources Protection
Act (NRPA),102 passed in 1988, declared that Maine’s rivers, streams,
ponds, mountains, and wetlands are significant state resources of “great
scenic beauty.”103  The NRPA underscores the significance the state places
on such natural resources “in terms of their recreational, historical, and
environmental value to present and future generations.”104  The intent of the
NRPA “is to prevent any unreasonable impact to, degradation of or
destruction of the resources and to encourage their protection or enhance-
ment.”105 In particular, the NRPA focuses on wetlands regulation, and
carves out specific restrictions on how wetlands can be utilized.106  The
DEP has noted the myriad uses for Maine’s wetlands, ranging from storing
water and controlling shoreline erosion, to providing critical habitats for
fish and wildlife.107
The NRPA is enforced by the DEP, which is charged by the legislature
with the duties of “preserv[ing], improv[ing] and prevent[ing] diminution
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108. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, OVERVIEW OF THE MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, http://www.maine.gov/dep/overview.htm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2006).  The DEP has evolved from the 1941 Sanitary Water Board which
was responsible for protecting the water supply.  Since then, throughout various
permutations, it has become the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the “state’s
environmental laws.”  Id.
109. 38 M.R.S.A. § 480-D (2004).
110. Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 11, 832 A.2d 765 at 768.  See also
5 M.R.S.A., § 11007(4)(C) (2002) (Judicial review of final agency actions can be reversed
or modified if: the actions violate the Constitution or other statutes; the actions are “in
excess” of the agency’s authority; the procedure upon which the actions is based are
unlawful, based on error or bias, or unsupported by evidence in the record; or the actions are
an abuse of discretion).
111. Id. at 769.  See also Connolly v. Bd. of Soc. Work Licensure, 2002 ME 37, ¶ 6, 791
A.2d 125, 127; Downeast Energy Corp. v. Fund Ins. Review Bd., 2000 ME 151, ¶ 13, 756
A.2d 948, 951.
112. See, e.g., Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 88, 876 A.2d 16. 
113. Note that the Board of Environmental Protection (“the Board”) is an organizational
department within the DEP that consists of ten individuals appointed by the governor.  The
Board is the entity that makes the permitting decisions.  Department of Environmental
Protection, State of Maine, available at http://www.maine.gov/dep/bep/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2006). 
114. 2005 ME 88, ¶ 11, 876 A.2d 16, 19.  Specifically, the Board had not “relate[d] its
finding that a practicable alternative exist[ed] to its overall determination of whether the
relevant section [of the NRPA] criteria were satisfied.”  Id.
of the natural environment of the State.”108  When reviewing a permit
application that implicates an environmental area under the umbrella of the
NRPA, the DEP can deny the application using various criteria, including
whether the proposed permit structure unreasonably interferes with the
existing natural resources’ scenic or aesthetic uses, and if practicable
alternatives to the proposed construction exist.109
Denials of permits by the DEP are appealed first to the Superior Court
and then to the Law Court, which critically reviews such rejections.110  The
court looks for any indication that the administrative board has abused its
discretion or made an error in applying the law.111  The court has found that
the DEP has both succeeded and erred in its analysis of the practical
alternatives standard.112   In Uliano v. Board of Environmental Protec-
tion,113 the court held that the DEP, in denying a permit for a dock, had
improperly applied the practicable alternative test by using it in isolation
from the standards outlined by the NRPA.114  In contrast, the court found
that the DEP appropriately applied the practicable alternatives test in C.H.
Rich Co. v. Board of Environmental Protection, when it denied a permit to
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115. 567 A.2d 69, 70 (Me. 1989).
116. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, 823
A.2d 551; Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, 832 A.2d 765.
117. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 41, 823 A.2d
at 564.
118. Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 14, 832 A.2d at 769. 
119. 2005 ME 50, 870 A.2d 566.
120. The dock was to consist of a 110-foot long permanent pier, followed by a fifty-foot
long seasonal ramp, and then a float measuring twenty feet.  Id. at ¶ 2, 870 A.2d at 568.
Originally, the petitioner had applied for a permit for an even larger dock. That proposal was
for a dock 160 feet in length and six feet wide, with an aluminum ramp of forty-eight feet
in length and four feet wide that led to a wooden float of an additional forty-eight feet in
length and fourteen feet across.  The entire pier was to rest upon three “granite cribs” that
were based within the tidal waters.  This original proposal was opposed not only by the
petitioner’s neighbors but also by the Town of Mount Desert.  The proposal was rejected by
the DEP.  The petitioner then resubmitted with the dock proposal upon which the ensuing
law suit was based.  See generally Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., KENSC-AP-03-19 (Me.
Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Jan. 6, 2004) (Studstrup, J.), available at 2004 WL 187830.
121. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50 ¶¶ 1-2, 870 A.2d at 568.
122. Id.
an applicant because the applicant’s purposes could be satisfied using
“other methods.”115
The court has also held that the DEP has denied permits based on
conclusions that were supported and not supported by evidence.116  In
Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Protection, the court found that the DEP had properly granted a permit for
a dock extending into twenty-five percent of a waterway because there was
sufficient evidence in the record that the proposed dock would not interfere
with the channel’s existing uses.117  Conversely, in Hannum v. Board of
Environmental Protection, the court reversed a permit denial due to
insubstantial evidence relied upon by the DEP in making its administrative
decision.  The court found that the DEP incorrectly speculated that
allowing one dock to be built would encourage more dock building in the
future.118
III. THE KROEGER DECISION
In Kroeger v. Department of Environmental Protection,119 Harold
Kroeger requested the court review a final decision made by the DEP.  The
plaintiff had submitted an application to the DEP for permission to build
a 180-foot dock120 extending from his property on Mount Desert Island into
Somes Sound, covering a wetland area of 138 square feet.121  He appealed
the DEP’s denial of his application to the Superior Court (Kennebec).122
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123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.  Arbitrary or capricious actions by administrative agencies must be “willful and
unreasoning” and “without consideration of the facts or circumstances.”  Id. at ¶ 8, 870 A.2d
at 569 (quoting Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 281 A.2d 233, 242
(Me. 1971)).
126. See supra note 3.
127. The NRPA defines “coastal wetlands” as:
[a]ll tidal and subtidal lands, including all areas below any identifiable debris line left
by tidal action; all areas with vegetation present that is tolerant of salt water and
occurs primarily in a salt water or estuarine habitat; and any swamp, marsh, bog,
beach, flat or other contiguous lowland which is subject to tidal action during the
maximum spring tide level as identified in tide tables published by the National
Ocean Service.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-B(2) (2004).
128. Kroeger v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50 ¶ 1, 870 A.2d at 568.
129. Id. at ¶ 21, 870 A.2d at 572.  The expert claimed the dock became less visible from
afar and that its dark green coloring would make the dock blend into the background.  Id.
at ¶ 11, 870 A.2d at 570.  To review the simulated photographs of the dock in question, see
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Visual Impacts, Apr. 4, 2006, available
at http:// coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/czm/dockpier/visualimpactsdoc.pdf. 
130. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 870 A.2d at 572.  The plaintiff argued: 1) he had notified the
Department; 2) utilizing a three-point hitch to maneuver his watercraft was impractical; and
3) the closest marina was two miles away.  Id.
131. Id. at ¶ 1, 870 A.2d at 568.  
The Superior Court granted intervenor status to a neighboring landowner
who opposed the plans for the dock and ultimately denied the plaintiff’s
appeal.123  The plaintiff then appealed to the Maine Law Court, which
affirmed the lower court.124
The plaintiff argued on appeal that the DEP’s findings were arbitrary
and contrary to the evidence in the record.125  He maintained that his
petition met the DEP’s standards126 regarding construction of a permanent
structure in or near wetlands127 and that it would not interfere with Somes
Sound’s scenic uses.128  The plaintiff relied on expert testimony and
photograph simulations to show that the dock would not visually interfere
with the existing shoreline and instead be compatible with the surroundings
due to its dark green color.129  The plaintiff also argued that there were no
practicable alternatives to his proposed dock due to the location of his
property and the impracticability of manually maneuvering a hitch bearing
watercraft down to the shoreline.130
On appeal, the DEP argued that the denial was appropriate because the
dock presented a visual disturbance to the aesthetics of the shoreline and
would result in the loss of coastal wetlands.131  The majority did not address
the loss of coastal wetlands in their opinion, as the failure of the petitioner
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132. Id. at ¶ 22, 870 A.2d at 573.
133. Kroeger v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50,  ¶ 12, 870 A.2d at 570.
134. Id. at ¶ 14, 870 A.2d at 570.  The DEP demonstrated that the photographs provided
by the plaintiff captured both the scenic beauty of the Sound and highlighted the lack of any
neighboring docks within 2,000 feet of his property.  Id.
135. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 870 A.2d at 572.  The DEP maintained that launching small craft
from the shore was possible and that the plaintiff could also utilize nearby local marinas.
Id.
136. Id. at ¶ 9, 870 A.2d at 569.
137. Id. at ¶ 10, 870 A.2d at 569-70.
138. Id. at ¶ 15, 870 A.2d at 570.
139. Id. at ¶¶ 13-16, 870 A.2d at 570-71.
140. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 15, 870 A.2d at 570.
141. Id.
142. 615 A.2d 255 (Me. 1992).
143. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 16, 870 A.2d at 571.  See also Kosalka
v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d 183, 187.  Even before the court
to meet the other standards of practicable alternative and non-interference
with scenic uses made such a discussion unnecessary.132  The intervenor
submitted an expert’s report that highlighted the significance tourists who
visit the area place on viewing “high quality” landscapes.133  The DEP also
noted that Somes Sound is close to Acadia National Park and is home to
“boaters, hikers and sightseers.”134  Lastly, the DEP argued that the plaintiff
had failed to show that he had no practicable alternatives to the dock.135
The Kroeger majority held that the DEP’s decision to deny the
plaintiff’s permit was not arbitrary and that the plaintiff had failed in his
burden to show that the proposed dock would not interfere with existing
scenic uses.136  The majority concluded that the record demonstrated that
the proposed dock would unreasonably interfere with the scenic use of
Somes Sound, the sole fjord on the east coast of the country.137  Noting that
visitors “flock” to Acadia National Park and Somes Sound in anticipation
of its aesthetic qualities,138  the court held that the dock’s placement on a
narrow reach of the sound would significantly contrast with the scenic
landscape.139
The majority dismissed the dissent’s contention that subtidal lands held
no scenic value.140  Refusing to limit the reading of the NRPA to only “tidal
and subtidal lands,” the majority concluded that the water covering the
lands and the “uses of the location in which the [dock] is to be constructed”
were common sense components of the regulation.141  Citing Murphy v.
Board of Environmental Protection,142 the court recognized the deference
given to the DEP when interpreting NRPA and therefore accepted its stance
that the general location of the dock would degrade Somes Sound’s existing
visual uses.143  The majority also showed deference to the DEP when it
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considers deferring to an administrative body’s discretionary decision, that agency in
question must have been provided adequate guidance for the exercise of said discretion by
the legislature.  Id.
144. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 20, 870 A.2d at 572.  The court faulted
the plaintiff for failing to provide alternatives in his first application and then for neglecting
to explain why shore launching of small watercraft was impracticable.  Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 870
A.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at ¶ 30, 870 A.2d at 574 (Dana, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at ¶ 32, 870 A.2d at 575.
147. Id. at ¶ 30, 870 A.2d at 574.
148. Id. at ¶ 31, 870 A.2d at 574.  Justice Dana asserted that, natural fjord or not, the
impact of the dock on the scenic uses of the wetland “would be virtually non-existent.”  Id.
at ¶ 32, 870 A.2d at 575.
149. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶¶ 38-41, 870 A.2d at 575-77.  Justice
Dana found ample evidence showing shore launching was impractical, including a steep
shoreline lined with boulders.  He also noted that the Legislature defined an alternative as
practicable if it is “based on the overall purpose of the project."  In Justice Dana’s view  the
sole purpose of plaintiff’s proposed dock was to access and enjoy the water from his
property and “not around the local marina.”  Id.
affirmed the DEP’s decision that the plaintiff actually had practicable
alternatives to the dock: the plaintiff could launch small watercraft from the
shore, as well as have water access via two local marinas.144
In his dissent, Justice Dana, joined by Justice Alexander, sharply
criticized the court for what he considered an expansive interpretation of
the NRPA statute.145  He argued that the analysis of the aesthetic impact of
the dock should be limited to subtidal wetlands, as “the only area relevant
. . . is the tidal land itself, not the landscape” of Somes Sound.146  He also
maintained that the subtidal wetlands “are not regarded as particularly
scenic or aesthetic, except perhaps by scuba divers [who are] underwater
all the time.”147  In addition, he argued that there was no evidence in the
record showing Somes Sound’s tidal lands possess a greater aesthetic value
than other tidal lands elsewhere in the state.148  Justice Dana also asserted
that the DEP’s stance on the plaintiff’s practicable alternatives was
arbitrary because the DEP ignored indications, both through the plaintiff’s
own application and through DEP visits to the site, that shore launching
was impractical.149
IV. THE IMPACT OF KROEGER ON AESTHETIC REGULATIONS IN MAINE
Kroeger brings to the surface the debate surrounding aesthetic
regulations: are they a permissible government purpose that can stand alone
within the general welfare prong of the police power, or must they rely
upon other areas of the police power for their justification?  Moreover,
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150. See, e.g., Richard Brooks & Peter Lavigne, Aesthetic Theory and Landscape
Protection: The Many Meanings of Beauty and Their Implications for the Design, Control,
and Protection of Vermont’s Landscape, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 129, 141 (1985)
(“[A]esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation . . . .”
(quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981)).
151. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME ¶ 16, 870 A.2d at 571.
Kroeger raises the question that haunts aesthetic regulations: what are the
standards behind them and are they permissible?  Neither the majority nor
the dissenting opinions clarified the preferred approach to aesthetic
regulation in Maine: ancillary or primary.  Instead, they both created further
ambiguity, with the majority utilizing both approaches and the dissent
hardly addressing either.  The primary shortcoming of both sides is that
neither acknowledged the frank discussion that the topic of aesthetic
regulations necessitates: that is, how should the court define aesthetics,
which are inherently subjective?150
The opportunity was ripe and the following factors were in place for
the court to address this issue: 1) DEP’s decision that the dock interrupts
existing scenic uses of Somes Sound; 2) Kroeger’s neighbors objecting so
strenuously to the dock that one became an intervenor in the case; 3) the
repeated mention of bikers, hikers, and boaters in the vicinity by the
majority; and 4) the highlighting of tourists’ expectations for, and dollars
spent visiting, Acadia National Park.  The court had a unique opportunity
for a frank discussion on aesthetic priorities in Maine but the majority
skirted the issues, and did not directly acknowledge its aesthetic
preferences.  Thus, it remains unclear if the court intentionally sent the
message that aesthetic regulations will prevail over property rights when
scenic resources are located near major tourist attractions.  
 The majority employed the ancillary method when it deemed Somes
Sound a tourist destination.  Its reliance on tourists’ expectations of
unadulterated scenic landscapes immediately linked aesthetics to the
economic health of Maine.  However, the majority also employed the
primary approach when it interpreted the definition of subtidal to include
the land, water, and general location of the dock.151  By their reasoning, to
focus solely on land rather than on general surroundings would have so
restricted the definition of scenic in this case as to render it devoid of any
intrinsic value whatsoever.  The dock—its size, color, and length—had to
be considered fully against the shoreline, any other neighboring docks, and
the entire fjord.  In that sense, aesthetic considerations were primary.
While the majority did not state as such, by deferring to the DEP’s
interpretation of “scenic uses,” it communicated that the dock aesthetically
did not belong within that environment.
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152. Id. at ¶ 30, n.6, 870 A.2d at 574 (Dana, J., dissenting)  Justice Dana stated,
“[b]ecause coastal wetlands, as defined by the Act, are the only protected natural resource
at issue here, we must limit the scope of our analysis to the Act's definition of that resource.”
Id.
153. Id. at ¶ 30, 870 A.2d at 574.
154. Id. at ¶ 31, 870 A.2d at 574.
155. Id. at ¶ 38, 870 A.2d at 576.
156. Id. at ¶ 40, 870 A.2d at 576.
157. The court provided helpful definitions regarding coastal private property ownership
in the case of Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, 823
A.2d 551.  “The public trust doctrine means, for the owner of coastal property, that the
Although the dissent addressed the aesthetic regulations at issue, the
opinion severely limited the scope of the debate.  The dissent minimized
the majority’s broad notion of general scenic value including the dock and
instead narrowly focused on the NRPA’s statutory language.152  Viewed by
the dissent, subtidal lands were of no value to anyone other than scuba
divers, a small constituency whose interests do not merit the protection of
aesthetic regulations.153  Interestingly, this precise view drew the dissent
closest to initiating an open debate about aesthetics and subjectivity.  By
saying that subtidal lands were not considered beautiful enough to prevent
the building of a dock, Justice Dana made a value judgment about beauty
that was not directly challenged by the majority.  Further, he pointed out
that if one were to follow the majority’s logic and accept the general scenic
value of the area, what may be considered aesthetic beyond the subtidal
water would be imperceptible to the public.  Not only did he accept that the
dock would be unobtrusive from afar due to its coloring, but the “rock,
seaweed, sand, shells, and various critters that occupy the tidal lands [of
Somes Sound], and may, on close inspection, offer some aesthetic value,
are largely invisible to boaters in the Sound and hikers in Acadia.”154 In his
dissent, Justice Dana echoes the minority jurisdictions that deny stand-
alone aesthetic regulations due to their risk of being arbitrary and
capricious.
By failing to address the inherent issue of subjectivity, the majority
glossed over crucial weaknesses in its own opinion.  First, the broad
deference it gave the DEP was apparently enough to dismiss what the
dissent deemed “plain” evidence that shore launching was not practicable
for the plaintiff due to the steep nature of the boulder-lined shore.155  The
majority de facto assumed that no barrier of age, physical ability, or
economic hardship would prevent one from maneuvering a boat down to
the shore.156  Second, the majority did not address the dissent’s concern
regarding the plaintiff’s “right to wharf-out to navigable waters” or the fact
that his riparian rights157 were potentially at odds with the wetlands
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owner's property rights in the intertidal zone are subject to the public's rights to fishing,
fowling and navigation.” Id. at ¶ 36, 823 A.2d at 563.  Such public rights, however, are
“subject to the owner’s right to wharf out to the navigable portion of the body of water.”  Id.
Finally, the land owner’s right to “construct a wharf to the navigable water is subject to
reasonable regulation.”  Id.  For an interesting look at Maine case law regarding riparian
rights, see Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Public Lands, 672 A.2d 91 (Me. 1996);  see
also Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 A. 516 (1906); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
158. Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2005 ME 50, ¶ 15, 870 A.2d at 576. 
159. Tom Groening, Tourist Dollars Up as Visits Drop Off, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr.
30, 2005, at A1.
160. Brian Roach, Jonathan Rubin & Charles Morris, Measuring Maine’s Marine
Economy,  ME. POL’Y REV., Fall 1999, at 56, 58.
161. National Park Service, Public Use Statistics Office, Visitation Database Reports, Park
by Year 1904-2004, available at http://www2.nature.nps.gov/stats (last visited Apr. 4,
2006).
statute.158  A property owner’s right to access water (e.g., by building a
dock) is to be weighed against the public’s use/navigation of such water, as
well as any “reasonable regulation” by the state.  Considering the overlap
between 1) Kroeger’s right as a land owner to access Somes Sound; 2) the
majority’s belief that Somes Sound is used by boaters and; 3) the
“reasonable regulation” of the NRPA as promulgated by the DEP, these
factors create a compelling stage for further discussion in order to help
determine the majority’s prioritization of aesthetics.  The court’s silence in
these areas as compared to its vocal endorsement of tourism raises the
question if and to what degree it prefers aesthetic regulations for scenic
landscapes when located in prime coastal tourist destinations. 
There is little wonder that the court stresses the importance of tourism.
Maine generated $9.5 billion in goods and services, 122,000 jobs, and $384
million in state and local taxes from its tourism industry in 2004.159
Commentators estimate that in Maine’s coastal counties, tourism nets the
state $166 million in taxes.160  Acadia National Park clearly plays a pivotal
financial role in Maine tourism, as 2.2 million people visited the park in
2004 alone.161  Given the crucial role tourism plays in the state’s economy,
the court’s interest in preventing the degradation of the state’s visual
resources in tourist areas makes sense.  Based on these notable facts and
figures, and the laudatory language employed by the majority, it is no great
stretch of the imagination to envision the court specifically endorsing
promotion of tourism as a separate public purpose under the general
welfare prong of the police power and thereby placing Maine within the
ancillary jurisdictions.  But a troubling question remains to be asked: what
if the plaintiff’s dock had been in an isolated section of coastal Maine,
away from Acadia and the tourist buses?  What would the Kroeger majority
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have decided then?  Would the majority’s preference for tourism fall away,
allowing property rights to thrive where aesthetic regulations might
otherwise be enforced?  The court’s judicial preferences regarding existing
aesthetic laws remain ambiguous.
Lastly, the Law Court did not consider the possibility of the Legislature
readdressing aesthetic regulations in Maine.  After all, it is from the
legislative arena that such regulations are born.  If signaled by the
Judiciary, the Legislature might consider crafting a regulatory “scale,” that
is, having aesthetic regulations in coastal tourist locations bear greater
weight, and less in areas that are not as heavily visited or economically
viable.  Alternatively, the Legislature can explicitly deem promotion of
tourism as falling within the police powers, thus establishing ancillary
aesthetic regulation as permissible and proper.  By having the Legislature
debate the subjective value judgments at the heart of aesthetic regulations,
the Law Court may then be able to more concretely address cases similar
to Kroeger in the future. 
V. CONCLUSION
The ambiguity surrounding aesthetic regulations in Maine will continue
after Kroeger.  The primary and ancillary approaches may well overlap
again, but their use may not reveal the unstated value judgments behind the
Law Court’s judicial opinions.  Where aesthetic regulations pertain to
scenic resources within coastal tourist destinations, the court will need to
assess what is worth preserving: the coast’s visual resources (and status as
a tourist attraction), or property rights?  If the court has specific aesthetic
or economic criteria, then let it speak more clearly.  This Note encourages
the Law Court, when approached with similar questions in the future, to
more concretely delineate its criteria when evaluating aesthetic regulations
in the state. 
